I think Kamus was not entirely wrong, in that, if a Stoic Sage (which, granted, Sisyphus is not) would find themselves in Sisyphus's predicament, he/she would not be despaired, as even in this situation you can still find, cultivate and act with Virtue/according to nature. The punishment ends up being not much of a punishment at all. :)
I also think that "The only good thing for me is my virtue." is a reasonable way to think about Stoicism and it does not necessarily lead to a selfish position. The idea being that only my virtue is up to me. I cannot affect your or someone else's virtue, only mine. Therefore, the good in my life is located in the development of my virtue and the vice is located in the decay of my virtue, the only thing that is up to me. Now, being a social creature, I cannot call myself a Virtuous man while disregarding other people. Not because of their virtue, but because of my own. It is a bad bee that disregards the hive. It is a bad human being that disregards the society around them.
"The only good for things is my virtue" is ambiguous. Does it mean:
A) There is only on good thing in the universe and that is my virtue
.or
B) The good for each and every individual is the virtue of that individual.
Obviously,. A is not Stoicism - and it follows from B that there is 1) lots of good in the universe and (together with the theory of oikeiosis) 2) that what we should care about is to develop and preserve virtue in ourselves and others. What makes it virtous to care about others is exactly that and only that - that we help them develop and preserve virtue. Stoicism is neither pragmatism nor contract theory. It is virtue ethics which means that every moral action aims to develop and preserve both the virtue of the agent and the other person(s).
Let's assume that the only good for any individual was their own virtue and not also the virtue of others. Why should I rescue a person from drowning rather than go home and watch movie? What would make it more virtous to save the drowning person than to go home and watch a movie?
Or: why should I not just help an alcoholic by providing him or her with lots of alcohol rather than help that person make wiser, more informed decisions?
Virtue is assenting to an appropriate impression. What makes it appropriate is context - who you are, what the situation is. You being a human being, a social creature from birth. Your role as a bystander. A drowning person. These aspects of the context make it appropriate for you to help the drowning person. Hence, helping is appropriate and virtuous for you personally, and not helping is vicious. It does not matter how virtuous the other person is, you cannot make them more or less virtuous as this is entirely up to them.
As Epictetus says - "There are things that are within our power, and there are things that are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs. Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien." Virtue of others is not within your power, so it cannot be Virtue and cannot be good. Only a preferred or dispreferred indifferent (which are still important!)
Sadly, all of the Roman Stoics seem to have a very limited understanding of the Stoic concept of "external goods". Cicero seems reasonable educated about it but from then on it's downhill.
Here is a great interview with Tony Long where he explains this essential concept:
Contrary to the Aristotelian concept of external goods (health, wealth, good reputation) the Stoic external goods are all determined by being instances if human virtue: a good community, a loving family, a good friend.
All social creatures love the virtue in the members of their species - since that is what define them as a species. Cows love the "cowness" of other cows, human beings love the humaneness of other humans.
Epictetus makes it abundantly clear that he does not understand that something can be good without our happiness depending on it:
""Then isn't health a good thing, and having an unimpaired body, and life? No, and not even our children, parents, and country? And who could accept that from you?"
Well, let's transfer the designation of good to those things. Is it possible, in that case, to be happy if one suffers injury and fails to acquire good things?
I think Kamus was not entirely wrong, in that, if a Stoic Sage (which, granted, Sisyphus is not) would find themselves in Sisyphus's predicament, he/she would not be despaired, as even in this situation you can still find, cultivate and act with Virtue/according to nature. The punishment ends up being not much of a punishment at all. :)
I also think that "The only good thing for me is my virtue." is a reasonable way to think about Stoicism and it does not necessarily lead to a selfish position. The idea being that only my virtue is up to me. I cannot affect your or someone else's virtue, only mine. Therefore, the good in my life is located in the development of my virtue and the vice is located in the decay of my virtue, the only thing that is up to me. Now, being a social creature, I cannot call myself a Virtuous man while disregarding other people. Not because of their virtue, but because of my own. It is a bad bee that disregards the hive. It is a bad human being that disregards the society around them.
"The only good for things is my virtue" is ambiguous. Does it mean:
A) There is only on good thing in the universe and that is my virtue
.or
B) The good for each and every individual is the virtue of that individual.
Obviously,. A is not Stoicism - and it follows from B that there is 1) lots of good in the universe and (together with the theory of oikeiosis) 2) that what we should care about is to develop and preserve virtue in ourselves and others. What makes it virtous to care about others is exactly that and only that - that we help them develop and preserve virtue. Stoicism is neither pragmatism nor contract theory. It is virtue ethics which means that every moral action aims to develop and preserve both the virtue of the agent and the other person(s).
Let's assume that the only good for any individual was their own virtue and not also the virtue of others. Why should I rescue a person from drowning rather than go home and watch movie? What would make it more virtous to save the drowning person than to go home and watch a movie?
Or: why should I not just help an alcoholic by providing him or her with lots of alcohol rather than help that person make wiser, more informed decisions?
Since virtue is what is good for everyone doing good for anyone means to help them develop and preserve virtue.
Virtue is assenting to an appropriate impression. What makes it appropriate is context - who you are, what the situation is. You being a human being, a social creature from birth. Your role as a bystander. A drowning person. These aspects of the context make it appropriate for you to help the drowning person. Hence, helping is appropriate and virtuous for you personally, and not helping is vicious. It does not matter how virtuous the other person is, you cannot make them more or less virtuous as this is entirely up to them.
As Epictetus says - "There are things that are within our power, and there are things that are beyond our power. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation, office, and, in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs. Now the things within our power are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; but those beyond our power are weak, dependent, restricted, alien." Virtue of others is not within your power, so it cannot be Virtue and cannot be good. Only a preferred or dispreferred indifferent (which are still important!)
Sadly, all of the Roman Stoics seem to have a very limited understanding of the Stoic concept of "external goods". Cicero seems reasonable educated about it but from then on it's downhill.
Here is a great interview with Tony Long where he explains this essential concept:
https://janniklindquist.substack.com/p/a-friend-is-not-an-indifferent-tony/comments
Contrary to the Aristotelian concept of external goods (health, wealth, good reputation) the Stoic external goods are all determined by being instances if human virtue: a good community, a loving family, a good friend.
All social creatures love the virtue in the members of their species - since that is what define them as a species. Cows love the "cowness" of other cows, human beings love the humaneness of other humans.
Epictetus makes it abundantly clear that he does not understand that something can be good without our happiness depending on it:
""Then isn't health a good thing, and having an unimpaired body, and life? No, and not even our children, parents, and country? And who could accept that from you?"
Well, let's transfer the designation of good to those things. Is it possible, in that case, to be happy if one suffers injury and fails to acquire good things?
"No, it's not possible"."
- Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.22.12-13
"of good things some are necessary for happiness, some are not."
- Stobaeus, Anthology 6d