As much as the Stoics saw themselves as Socratics, one huge difference between Socrates and the Stoics is that Socrates does not try to persuade people to care about philosophy by promising them a less troubled mind. He is not focusing on miserable people but on persons who are quite content - often because of their reputation for excellence. In fact, after talking to Socrates, these people often feel worse than before he questioned their basic assumptions. This is so even in Plato’s famous Allegory of the Cave in Republic. The people in the cave are quite pleased with their lives until a philosopher releases their chains and forces them to stand up and begin the process of seeing things as they really are. The beginning of that process, is described as painful and confusing. Obviously, they will have a better life as philosophers - but the starting point is to make them aware of the unsustainable basis of their contentment.
In fact, Socrates compares himself to a gadfly annoying a sleepy horse:
“if you do put me to death, you won’t easily find anyone else quite like me, attached by the god to the city, if it’s not too comic an image, as if to a horse – a big and noble horse, but one that’s rather sleepy because of its size, all the time needing to be woken up by some sort of gadfly: this is the kind of role the god gave me when he attached me to the city, and the result is that there’s never a a moment when I’m not waking you up and cajoling and rebuking you, each one of you, the whole day long, settling on you wherever you may be. Another one like me, Athenians, as I say, it won’t be easy for you to find, and if you take my advice you’ll spare me; but probably you’ll be irritated at me, and like people who are woken up as they’re nodding off you’ll hit out at me, taking Anytus’ advice instead of mine, and take the easy course of putting me to death, after which you’ll spend the rest of your lives asleep, unless in his care for you the god should send someone else to stop you”.
Socrates defending (!) himself in Plato's Apology, 30e-31a
This quote from Plato’s Laches describes Socrates' approach well:
“NICIAS: You seem not to know that whenever anyone comes face to face with Socrates and has a conversation with him, what invariably happens is that, although they may have started on a completely different subject at first, Socrates will keep heading him off as they're talking until he has him trapped into giving an account of his present life-style, and of the way he has spent his life in the past. And once he has him trapped, Socrates won't let him go before he has well and truly cross-examined him on every angle. Now I'm well acquainted with him, and I know that putting up with this treatment from him is inevitable; and what's more, I'll get the same treatment myself, I'm sure of that. I enjoy his company, you see, Lysimachus, and I don't think there's anything wrong in suggesting that we haven't acted properly in the past, or that we're not doing so now. On the contrary, you're bound to be more careful about your way of life in future if you don't shrink from this treatment, but believe, as Solon said, that it's right to go on learning as long as you live, and are prepared to do so because you don't assume that wisdom is an automatic consequence of old age. To me there's nothing unusual, or annoying either, about being cross-examined by Socrates; in fact, I was fairly certain some time ago that with Socrates here it wouldn't be the boys we'd be talking about, but ourselves. So, what I'm saying is that, as far as I'm concerned, there's no reason why I shouldn't spend the time with him as he wants; but you'd better see what Laches feels about this kind of thing”.
- The Athenian gerneral Nicias talking to the Athenian gentleman Lysimachus in Plato’s Laches 187e-188c
The art of measurement which Socrates talks about in Protagoras is, of course, wisdom understood as the knowledge of the true value of everything. And that art is exactly advertised as being able to save us from regrets and to bring us peace of mind - which raises the question: why is Socrates not making more out of this aspect of philosophy?
"'Do the same magnitudes appear larger to you folks by sight from nearby and smaller from far away or not?' They'll say they do. 'And is it the same way with thickness and multitude? And do equal sounds also appear greater from nearby and smaller from far away?' They'd say so. 'So if doing well consisted for us in this, in acting on and taking large distances while avoiding and not acting on small ones, what would appear to us as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of what appears? Didn't the latter lead us astray and make us mistake the same things back and forth over and over again and have regrets in both our actions and our choices of large and small things, when measurement would have deprived this appearance of its authority, and, by revealing what was true, would have made our soul hold itself at rest, abiding in truth, and would have been the salvation of our life?' In response to this, would human beings agree that measurement is the art that keeps us safe, or say it's some other?” “Measurement,” he agreed. “'And what if the salvation of our life consisted for us in choosing what was odd or even, either in itself in relation to itself or one thing in numerical ratio to another, whenever it was necessary to choose the greater rightly as well as when it was necessary to choose the lesser, whether it was nearby or far away? What would save our life for us? Wouldn't it be knowledge? And wouldn't it be a certain kind of measurement, seeing as how the art is concerned with excess and deficiency? And since it's concerned with odd and even, would it be anything other than arithmetic?' Would human beings agree with us or not?" It seemed to Protagoras too that they'd agree.
"So be it, human beings. Now since the salvation of our life has plainly appeared to us as consisting in a right choice of pleasure and pain, of the greater and lesser, larger and smaller, farther and nearer, doesn't it appear first of all as an art of measurement, since it is an examination of their excess, deficiency, and equality in relation to one another?"" "Necessarily so." "And since it's an art of measurement, it's no doubt by necessity an art and knowledge."" "They join in saying so.""
- Socrates talking to Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras, 356c-357b.
This quote from Plato’s Laches describes Socrates' approach well:
“NICIAS: You seem not to know that whenever anyone comes face to face with Socrates and has a conversation with him, what invariably happens is that, although they may have started on a completely different subject at first, Socrates will keep heading him off as they're talking until he has him trapped into giving an account of his present life-style, and of the way he has spent his life in the past. And once he has him trapped, Socrates won't let him go before he has well and truly cross-examined him on every angle. Now I'm well acquainted with him, and I know that putting up with this treatment from him is inevitable; and what's more, I'll get the same treatment myself, I'm sure of that. I enjoy his company, you see, Lysimachus, and I don't think there's anything wrong in suggesting that we haven't acted properly in the past, or that we're not doing so now. On the contrary, you're bound to be more careful about your way of life in future if you don't shrink from this treatment, but believe, as Solon said, that it's right to go on learning as long as you live, and are prepared to do so because you don't assume that wisdom is an automatic consequence of old age. To me there's nothing unusual, or annoying either, about being cross-examined by Socrates; in fact, I was fairly certain some time ago that with Socrates here it wouldn't be the boys we'd be talking about, but ourselves. So, what I'm saying is that, as far as I'm concerned, there's no reason why I shouldn't spend the time with him as he wants; but you'd better see what Laches feels about this kind of thing”.
- The Athenian gerneral Nicias talking to the Athenian gentleman Lysimachus in Plato’s Laches 187e-188c
Perhaps part of the reason for the widespread hate against Seneca is his determination to be irritating. To "lambast vice" as he says.
I think I'll have to take back my words:
The art of measurement which Socrates talks about in Protagoras is, of course, wisdom understood as the knowledge of the true value of everything. And that art is exactly advertised as being able to save us from regrets and to bring us peace of mind - which raises the question: why is Socrates not making more out of this aspect of philosophy?
"'Do the same magnitudes appear larger to you folks by sight from nearby and smaller from far away or not?' They'll say they do. 'And is it the same way with thickness and multitude? And do equal sounds also appear greater from nearby and smaller from far away?' They'd say so. 'So if doing well consisted for us in this, in acting on and taking large distances while avoiding and not acting on small ones, what would appear to us as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of what appears? Didn't the latter lead us astray and make us mistake the same things back and forth over and over again and have regrets in both our actions and our choices of large and small things, when measurement would have deprived this appearance of its authority, and, by revealing what was true, would have made our soul hold itself at rest, abiding in truth, and would have been the salvation of our life?' In response to this, would human beings agree that measurement is the art that keeps us safe, or say it's some other?” “Measurement,” he agreed. “'And what if the salvation of our life consisted for us in choosing what was odd or even, either in itself in relation to itself or one thing in numerical ratio to another, whenever it was necessary to choose the greater rightly as well as when it was necessary to choose the lesser, whether it was nearby or far away? What would save our life for us? Wouldn't it be knowledge? And wouldn't it be a certain kind of measurement, seeing as how the art is concerned with excess and deficiency? And since it's concerned with odd and even, would it be anything other than arithmetic?' Would human beings agree with us or not?" It seemed to Protagoras too that they'd agree.
"So be it, human beings. Now since the salvation of our life has plainly appeared to us as consisting in a right choice of pleasure and pain, of the greater and lesser, larger and smaller, farther and nearer, doesn't it appear first of all as an art of measurement, since it is an examination of their excess, deficiency, and equality in relation to one another?"" "Necessarily so." "And since it's an art of measurement, it's no doubt by necessity an art and knowledge."" "They join in saying so.""
- Socrates talking to Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras, 356c-357b.