"Even he who delays you does great harm, especially since life is so short. And we make it even shorter by our inconsistency, when we make one fresh start after another. We tear it to bits; we shred it".
"As you progress, strive above all to be consistent with yourself. If ever you want to find out whether anything has been achieved, observe whether your intentions are the same today as they were yesterday. A change of intention shows that the mind is at sea, drifting here and there as carried by the wind. A thing that is well grounded does not move about. That is how it is for the completely wise person, and also to some extent for the one who is making progress toward wisdom. What is the difference, then? The progressor moves, but does not shift position; he merely bobs in place. The wise person does not move at all."
"philosophy is so sacred, so deserving of respect, that anything that resembles it gives some satisfaction, even if it is only a sham. When a person is devoted to leisure, ordinary people tend to assume that he is on retreat, tranquil, self-sufficient, living for himself, when in fact these qualities pertain only to the wise person. He alone is the one who knows how to live for himself; for he knows how to live, and that has to come first. Someone who runs away from the world and from people; who has gone into exile because his desires failed to prosper, and because he could not bear to see others more prosperous than he; who has gone to earth out of fear, like some idle and timorous animal-that person is living not for himself but (most shameful of all!) for the belly, for sleep, for lust. It does not follow that he is living for himself just because he is living for no one at all. Yet such a fine thing is consistency in action and perseverance in one's intent that even idleness is respected if one persists in it."
"virtue is made up of consistency: all its actions harmonize and agree with one another. This harmony is lost if the mind, which by rights should be elevated, is brought down by desire or grief. All anxiety and worry is dishonorable, all reluctance to act; for honorable conduct is sure and unhampered, undismayed, ever standing at the ready".
- Seneca, Letters 74.30
Seneca is pointing here to how absence of negative passions is a requirement for any kind of consistency in values - and, thus, how just talking about consistency quickly leads us to claims about objective - universally shared - values.
"the person who takes second rank in that he is not sufficiently consistent to preserve the right in all situations the one whose judgment is still fallible and weak-even he is near the mark. Imagine this person to lack vision and hearing, good health, a reasonable appearance, and a longish lifespan with all his faculties intact. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, he can live a life he does not regret. But in the imperfect man there remains some tendency toward badness, because his mind is still capable of being motivated toward wrongdoing, although deeply ingrained and active badness is gone from it. He is not yet good, only someone being fashioned in that direction; and one who lacks anything with respect to good, is bad."
"Zeno defines the goal as `life in agreement,' and he seemingly did not see the need to offer a complete phrase that elucidates what one's life should be in agreement with. The brief formula 'life in agreement' probably implicitly refers to life in agreement with nature, but it may also refer to some kind of internal consistency of the virtuous agent. Scholars largely agree that the fact that Zeno does not add `with nature' does not mean that he would not accept the implications of this addition. Zeno's political views might be formulated in a similarly dense way."
- Katja Maria Vogt: "Law, Reason and the Cosmic City", p. 79.
In my opinion, Seneca's and Cicero's focus on consistency almost certainly reflect a strand in Stoicism going back to Zeno’s idea of "living in agreement".
"If we are to believe the report of Arius Didymus, Zeno himself did not add the specification 'consistently with nature' to the formula for the goal of life, 'living consistently'. That, we are told here, is the work for his followers. But it is a mistake to think that Zeno differed substantially from his orthodox successors on this subject. For one thing, Zeno is also credited with the fuller formulation by Diogenes Laertius who says that he gave this definition of the goal of life in his book On Human Nature (which was also entitled On Impulse). Moreover, there are abundant indications that later Stoics understood the two formulations as being complementary, if not as meaning the same thing. According to Arius Didymus the disharmony of the fool is a disharmony both with himself and with god. Seneca, who frequently emphasizes the need for consistency with oneself, also says that the way to achieve this is to be correct in one's actions and desires (which means that they should agree with Nature or god's will). 'If you wish to want the same thing always, you must want vera', ie. what is true and right. 'No one can always be pleased by the same thing unless it is by what is right. Chrysippus is making essentially the same point when he explicates the goal of life as 'living according to our own nature and that of the Universe', which he then identifies with the smooth flow of life.
And a convergence of self-consistency and consistency with the Nature of the Universe is exactly what we would expect. For in a rational and therefore consistent Universe, consistency with one's own life will be a necessary condition for consistency with the whole of which one is a part. This consistency with oneself will also be a corollary of consistency with Nature as a whole. But the Stoics would also have claimed that in their deterministic but providential world, if one failed to achieve harmony with nature, sooner or later one would fall out of harmony with oneself. Only if one's plans and actions are in accord with all mastering fate will one be safe from defeat, disappointment, and regret. And since man has fundamental and inborn inclinations to live the moral life, any falling away from the moral commands laid down by Zeus will be by the same token a repudiation of one's own true self and deepest nature. Thus to live consistently with oneself is possible if and only if one lives consistently with Nature as a whole."
- Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, p. 105-106
Virtue is a consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life."
"All these men agree in taking virtue to be a certain character and power of the soul’s commanding-faculty, engendered by reason, or rather, a character which is itself consistent, firm, and unchangeable reason".
- Plutarch, On moral virtue 440E–441D (Long and Sedley 61B).
Malcolm Schofield on the two formulations of the goal of life ("life in agreement" and "life in agreement with nature"):
"They do not say the same thing...we might take ‘living consistently’ to characterise the behaviour which satisfies the conditions that are implicit in the concept of goal, but ‘living consistently with nature’ to be an attempt at something rather different: an indication of how from the point of view of a student of nature such consistent behaviour relates to the natural order – indeed, a pointer to the explanation of how it is that someone could achieve consistency in living. On this view of the matter, there is something like a nonaccidental pun on ‘consistently’, and the two formulae do in a sense come to the same thing: we shall live consistently (i.e., each with his or her own self) if and only if we live consistently with nature."
- Malcom Schofield, "Stoic Ethics", in The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism, location 5404-5416
My basic point is that there is a massive difference between on the one side telling someone that they should live according to nature and on the other side helping them to achieve consistency in their values. The end result will be the same - but the point of departure is hugely different.
I like the less-is-more approach we see in the version of Zeno’s definition of the goal of life that we found in Stobaeus' "Anthology". In theory, it should be easier to find agreement on the idea that a good life is a life in psychological harmony than on the idea that a good life is a life is a life in agreement with a providential cosmos - even when those two lifes are one and the same life. In fact, I'm tempted to think that this less-is-more approach is why Socrates says very little about nature in Plato's dialogues. Even in Republic the point of departure is not even a claim about the superiority of a life according to reason but a question: which life is best? A life where reason rules or a life where appetite rules? Obviously, the answer turns out to be: the life of reason. The rule of reason is the virtue Plato calls justice in Republic and his idea of justice as psychological harmony is stikingly similar to Zeno’s idea of homologia in the quote preserved by Stobaeus.
Which raises the question: is Plato's justice really a virtue or a characteristic of any virtue - like Zeno's homologia?
Very interesting! Where does the "live in agreement with nature" maxim comes from, if not from Zeno? :)
More from Seneca:
"Even he who delays you does great harm, especially since life is so short. And we make it even shorter by our inconsistency, when we make one fresh start after another. We tear it to bits; we shred it".
- Seneca, Letters 32.2
"As you progress, strive above all to be consistent with yourself. If ever you want to find out whether anything has been achieved, observe whether your intentions are the same today as they were yesterday. A change of intention shows that the mind is at sea, drifting here and there as carried by the wind. A thing that is well grounded does not move about. That is how it is for the completely wise person, and also to some extent for the one who is making progress toward wisdom. What is the difference, then? The progressor moves, but does not shift position; he merely bobs in place. The wise person does not move at all."
- Seneca, Letters 35.4
"philosophy is so sacred, so deserving of respect, that anything that resembles it gives some satisfaction, even if it is only a sham. When a person is devoted to leisure, ordinary people tend to assume that he is on retreat, tranquil, self-sufficient, living for himself, when in fact these qualities pertain only to the wise person. He alone is the one who knows how to live for himself; for he knows how to live, and that has to come first. Someone who runs away from the world and from people; who has gone into exile because his desires failed to prosper, and because he could not bear to see others more prosperous than he; who has gone to earth out of fear, like some idle and timorous animal-that person is living not for himself but (most shameful of all!) for the belly, for sleep, for lust. It does not follow that he is living for himself just because he is living for no one at all. Yet such a fine thing is consistency in action and perseverance in one's intent that even idleness is respected if one persists in it."
- Seneca, Letters 55.4-5
"virtue is made up of consistency: all its actions harmonize and agree with one another. This harmony is lost if the mind, which by rights should be elevated, is brought down by desire or grief. All anxiety and worry is dishonorable, all reluctance to act; for honorable conduct is sure and unhampered, undismayed, ever standing at the ready".
- Seneca, Letters 74.30
Seneca is pointing here to how absence of negative passions is a requirement for any kind of consistency in values - and, thus, how just talking about consistency quickly leads us to claims about objective - universally shared - values.
"the person who takes second rank in that he is not sufficiently consistent to preserve the right in all situations the one whose judgment is still fallible and weak-even he is near the mark. Imagine this person to lack vision and hearing, good health, a reasonable appearance, and a longish lifespan with all his faculties intact. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, he can live a life he does not regret. But in the imperfect man there remains some tendency toward badness, because his mind is still capable of being motivated toward wrongdoing, although deeply ingrained and active badness is gone from it. He is not yet good, only someone being fashioned in that direction; and one who lacks anything with respect to good, is bad."
- Seneca, Letters 92.28-29
"Zeno defines the goal as `life in agreement,' and he seemingly did not see the need to offer a complete phrase that elucidates what one's life should be in agreement with. The brief formula 'life in agreement' probably implicitly refers to life in agreement with nature, but it may also refer to some kind of internal consistency of the virtuous agent. Scholars largely agree that the fact that Zeno does not add `with nature' does not mean that he would not accept the implications of this addition. Zeno's political views might be formulated in a similarly dense way."
- Katja Maria Vogt: "Law, Reason and the Cosmic City", p. 79.
In my opinion, Seneca's and Cicero's focus on consistency almost certainly reflect a strand in Stoicism going back to Zeno’s idea of "living in agreement".
Compare with Diogenes Laertius, 7.87:
"Thus Zeno first, in his book On Human Nature, said that the goal was to live in agreement with nature, which is to live according to virtue."
"If we are to believe the report of Arius Didymus, Zeno himself did not add the specification 'consistently with nature' to the formula for the goal of life, 'living consistently'. That, we are told here, is the work for his followers. But it is a mistake to think that Zeno differed substantially from his orthodox successors on this subject. For one thing, Zeno is also credited with the fuller formulation by Diogenes Laertius who says that he gave this definition of the goal of life in his book On Human Nature (which was also entitled On Impulse). Moreover, there are abundant indications that later Stoics understood the two formulations as being complementary, if not as meaning the same thing. According to Arius Didymus the disharmony of the fool is a disharmony both with himself and with god. Seneca, who frequently emphasizes the need for consistency with oneself, also says that the way to achieve this is to be correct in one's actions and desires (which means that they should agree with Nature or god's will). 'If you wish to want the same thing always, you must want vera', ie. what is true and right. 'No one can always be pleased by the same thing unless it is by what is right. Chrysippus is making essentially the same point when he explicates the goal of life as 'living according to our own nature and that of the Universe', which he then identifies with the smooth flow of life.
And a convergence of self-consistency and consistency with the Nature of the Universe is exactly what we would expect. For in a rational and therefore consistent Universe, consistency with one's own life will be a necessary condition for consistency with the whole of which one is a part. This consistency with oneself will also be a corollary of consistency with Nature as a whole. But the Stoics would also have claimed that in their deterministic but providential world, if one failed to achieve harmony with nature, sooner or later one would fall out of harmony with oneself. Only if one's plans and actions are in accord with all mastering fate will one be safe from defeat, disappointment, and regret. And since man has fundamental and inborn inclinations to live the moral life, any falling away from the moral commands laid down by Zeus will be by the same token a repudiation of one's own true self and deepest nature. Thus to live consistently with oneself is possible if and only if one lives consistently with Nature as a whole."
- Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, p. 105-106
Long and Sedley 61A:
"Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (SVF 3.39)
Virtue is a consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life."
"All these men agree in taking virtue to be a certain character and power of the soul’s commanding-faculty, engendered by reason, or rather, a character which is itself consistent, firm, and unchangeable reason".
- Plutarch, On moral virtue 440E–441D (Long and Sedley 61B).
Malcolm Schofield on the two formulations of the goal of life ("life in agreement" and "life in agreement with nature"):
"They do not say the same thing...we might take ‘living consistently’ to characterise the behaviour which satisfies the conditions that are implicit in the concept of goal, but ‘living consistently with nature’ to be an attempt at something rather different: an indication of how from the point of view of a student of nature such consistent behaviour relates to the natural order – indeed, a pointer to the explanation of how it is that someone could achieve consistency in living. On this view of the matter, there is something like a nonaccidental pun on ‘consistently’, and the two formulae do in a sense come to the same thing: we shall live consistently (i.e., each with his or her own self) if and only if we live consistently with nature."
- Malcom Schofield, "Stoic Ethics", in The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism, location 5404-5416
My basic point is that there is a massive difference between on the one side telling someone that they should live according to nature and on the other side helping them to achieve consistency in their values. The end result will be the same - but the point of departure is hugely different.
I like the less-is-more approach we see in the version of Zeno’s definition of the goal of life that we found in Stobaeus' "Anthology". In theory, it should be easier to find agreement on the idea that a good life is a life in psychological harmony than on the idea that a good life is a life is a life in agreement with a providential cosmos - even when those two lifes are one and the same life. In fact, I'm tempted to think that this less-is-more approach is why Socrates says very little about nature in Plato's dialogues. Even in Republic the point of departure is not even a claim about the superiority of a life according to reason but a question: which life is best? A life where reason rules or a life where appetite rules? Obviously, the answer turns out to be: the life of reason. The rule of reason is the virtue Plato calls justice in Republic and his idea of justice as psychological harmony is stikingly similar to Zeno’s idea of homologia in the quote preserved by Stobaeus.
Which raises the question: is Plato's justice really a virtue or a characteristic of any virtue - like Zeno's homologia?