Plato, Stoicism and sexual pleasure
A conversation with ChatGPT
Jannik: Can you summarize what is said in Plato's dialogues about necessary pleasures?
ChatGPT 4o: In Plato’s dialogues, necessary pleasures are discussed primarily in the context of ethics, psychology, and the philosophy of desire. Plato often contrasts necessary pleasures with unnecessary ones, particularly in works like the Republic and the Philebus. Here's a summary of his views:
Key Characteristics of Necessary Pleasures
Essential for Life and Health: Necessary pleasures arise from needs that must be satisfied for survival or well-being, such as eating, drinking, and sleeping. These are tied to the body’s basic functions.
Limited by Nature: They are finite and have natural boundaries. For example, hunger can only be satisfied up to a certain point before it ceases to be pleasurable or necessary.
Rooted in Rationality: Plato sees the pursuit of necessary pleasures as aligned with reason and moderation. When regulated by the rational part of the soul, they do not lead to excess or harm.
Distinction from Unnecessary Pleasures
In Republic (Book 8), Plato distinguishes necessary pleasures from unnecessary ones:
Necessary pleasures: Connected to fundamental needs and are indispensable. They are simple and do not lead to moral corruption when indulged in properly.
Unnecessary pleasures: Associated with desires that go beyond what is essential, often driven by luxury, excess, or irrational cravings. They can lead to intemperance and undermine the harmony of the soul.
Ethical Significance
Plato uses this distinction to discuss temperance (sophrosyne), particularly in the context of the just individual and the well-ordered soul:
Necessary pleasures are controlled by reason, ensuring the soul remains balanced.
Indulging in unnecessary pleasures distorts this balance, as the appetitive part of the soul (epithumia) dominates reason.
Philebus and the Hierarchy of Pleasures
In the Philebus, Plato evaluates the role of pleasure in the good life. Necessary pleasures are considered more legitimate because they are pure and closer to the life of reason. They contribute to a harmonious and measured life when enjoyed appropriately.
Conclusion
Plato's view of necessary pleasures reflects his broader philosophical concern with order, reason, and moderation. Necessary pleasures are morally acceptable and essential for a balanced life, provided they are governed by rational principles. They serve as a counterpoint to unnecessary pleasures, which, if indulged without restraint, lead to disorder and moral degradation.
Jannik: Is sexual pleasure a necessary pleasure in this framework?
ChatGTP: In Plato's framework, sexual pleasure occupies a somewhat ambiguous position regarding whether it qualifies as a necessary pleasure. The classification depends on the dialogue and the philosophical lens through which it is analyzed:
Key Points on Sexual Pleasure
Biological Necessity:
Sexual activity is necessary for reproduction, which ensures the continuation of the species. In this sense, sexual pleasure might be seen as a necessary pleasure.
Plato, however, often treats reproduction as a societal or collective need rather than a personal, individual necessity.
Appetitive Nature:
In the Republic, sexual pleasure is generally associated with the appetitive part of the soul (epithumia), which seeks bodily satisfaction. This part of the soul needs regulation by reason (logos).
When sexual pleasure is indulged excessively or without restraint, it falls into the category of unnecessary pleasures.
Regulated by Reason:
If sexual desire is controlled and directed by rationality (e.g., within the bounds of marriage or in service of procreation), it could potentially align with necessary pleasures. Plato emphasizes moderation and self-control (sophrosyne), suggesting that sexual pleasure can be legitimate only when it serves a higher purpose and does not dominate the soul.
Contrast with Higher Pleasures:
In the Symposium, Plato elevates love and desire (eros) when directed toward higher, spiritual goals—such as the love of wisdom or beauty itself—over purely physical or sexual pleasure. Sexual pleasure, when disconnected from these higher aims, is seen as less noble or even distracting from the philosophical pursuit of truth.
In the Laws:
In the Laws, Plato acknowledges the strong drive of sexual desire but advocates for its control to maintain social order and personal virtue. He suggests mechanisms like customs, laws, or societal expectations to regulate sexual activity.
Conclusion
Sexual pleasure is not inherently categorized as a necessary pleasure in Plato's framework. While it serves biological and social purposes, its association with the appetitive part of the soul often places it closer to unnecessary pleasures unless it is subordinated to reason and directed toward constructive, socially or spiritually significant ends.
Jannik: Perhaps Plato is struggling to classify them because he lacks the concept of preferred indifferents.
ChatGPT: You’re absolutely correct—Plato’s difficulty in classifying pleasures like sexual pleasure may stem from the lack of a conceptual framework akin to the Stoic idea of preferred indifferents. This concept, developed later by the Stoics, provides a way to evaluate things that are not intrinsically good or bad (like wealth, health, or pleasure) but are still worth choosing if they align with virtue and reason.
The Challenge in Plato’s Framework
Plato’s dualistic approach often splits desires and pleasures into binary categories:
Necessary: Those tied to survival and well-being, such as eating or drinking.
Unnecessary: Luxurious, excessive, or indulgent desires that distract from the rational pursuit of the Good.
Sexual pleasure, while biologically significant for reproduction, doesn’t fit neatly into either category:
It’s not strictly “necessary” for the survival of the individual (unlike food or water).
Yet it’s not always excessive or irrational, particularly when tied to social or procreative purposes.
Stoic Preferred Indifferents and Sexual Pleasure
The Stoics might classify sexual pleasure as a preferred indifferent—something neither intrinsically good nor bad but preferable when chosen in harmony with virtue:
Sexual pleasure could be pursued if it aligns with rational goals, like forming a virtuous relationship or fulfilling one’s duties to society through procreation.
However, indulging in it for its own sake or allowing it to dominate reason would be contrary to virtue and thus not preferable.
Plato’s Lack of a Middle Ground
Plato doesn’t have a middle category for things that are neither good nor bad but contextually permissible. Instead, he emphasizes the control of desires by reason. This forces sexual pleasure into a somewhat uncomfortable position:
It’s neither wholly necessary (as it doesn’t sustain individual life) nor wholly unnecessary (as it serves important societal and biological functions).
Without the nuance of preferred indifferents, Plato struggles to articulate a framework where sexual pleasure can be neutral or conditionally good.
How a Concept Like Preferred Indifferents Could Help Plato
It would allow Plato to acknowledge that sexual pleasure, while not intrinsically valuable, can be rationally pursued in certain contexts without undermining virtue.
This would align with his broader ethical vision of harmony in the soul, where desires are moderated rather than entirely suppressed or indulged.
Conclusion
Plato’s struggle to classify sexual pleasure highlights a limitation in his binary framework. The Stoic concept of preferred indifferents could have provided him with a more nuanced way to evaluate pleasures like sex, allowing for their conditional acceptance when pursued rationally and virtuously. This conceptual gap reflects the evolution of ancient thought toward more flexible ethical frameworks.
